The NTRU cryptosystem is the most practical scheme known to date and has drawn considerable interest. In this paper, we propose a new and uniform broadcast attack against several variants of NTRU by using a fact that the inner product of the error vector (r, r) is a constant. Using some properties of circular matrix together with linearization, we obtain three linear congruence equations of the form a
INTRODUCTION
In 1998, Hoffstein, Pipher and Silverman [1] presented a public key cryptosystem based on polynomial algebra called NTRU, denoted by NTRU-1998. The security of NTRU comes from the interaction of the polynomial mixing system with the independence of reduction modulo p and q. The NTRU cryptosystem is the most practical scheme known to date. It features reasonably short, easily created keys, high speed, and low memory requirements. In 2001, Hoffstein and Silverman [2] put forward another instance of NTRU, denoted by NTRU-2001, by employing different parameter sets. In 2005, Howgrave-Graham, Silverman and Whyte [3] gave the third instance of NTRU, denoted by NTRU-2005.
The very efficient attack known against NTRU is based on lattice reduction, but this does not imply that lattice reduction is necessary to break NTRU. Coppersmith and Shamir [4] pointed out that the security of NTRU is related, but not equivalent, to the hardness of some lattice problems. Jaulmes and Joux [5] showed that they are able to conduct a chosen-ciphertext attack that recovers the secret key from a few ciphertexts/cleartexts pairs with good probability. This is very dangerous. Most of the ciphertext-only attacks [6, 7, 8] against NTRU rely on the underlying lattice's special cyclic structure.
In 1988, Hästad [9] proposed the first broadcast attack against public key cryptosystems. The scenario of a broadcast attack is as follows. A single message is encrypted by the sender directed for multiple recipients who have different public keys. By observing the ciphertexts only, an attacker can derive the plaintext without requiring any knowledge of any recipient's secret key.
In 2009, Plantard and Susilo [10] first considered the broadcast attack against the lattice-based public-key cryptosystems and also gave some heuristic attacks.
Very recently, Pan and Deng [11] give the first broadcast attack against NTRU using the ergodic-linearization algorithm [12, 13, 14] . The main idea of ergodic-linearization technique is used in practical cryptanalysis: use interpolation formula to even out the noise to derive a set of precise nonlinear equations, then introduce new variables for the monomials and obtain a linear system in the new variables. What's more, Pan and Deng [11] pointed out that some other lattice-based cryptosystems, such as [15] , can not resist the broadcast attack either.
In this paper, we find that for NTRU the inner product (r, r) = r T r is a constant, where r is a vector consisting of the coefficients of r(x) ∈ Lr. Hence, we eliminate the blinding value vector r directly and entirety by doing inner product. Afterwards by using some properties of the circular matrix together with linearization we obtain three linear congruence equations of the form a T Y = s mod q with N + [ ) in [11] . Our algorithm is based on the special structure of the blinding value space Lr, which is also a ciphertext-only attack. Besides, we find that the error vector in the original GGH cryptosystem and the modified error vector in GGH-2009 have the same special structure. Hence, we first discuss the broadcast attacks against the original GGH and GGH-2009 by amending the ergodic-linearization algorithm [12, 13, 14] , then naturally deduce the broadcast attack against NTRU.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some preliminaries. In Section 3, we describe the broadcast attack against NTRU. Section 4 gives a short conclusion.
PRELIMINARIES
We denote the integer ring by Z and denote the residue class ring Z/qZ by Zq. We use bold letters to denote vectors, in column notation. If v is a vector, then we denote the i-th entry of v by vi−1.
GGH
We briefly review the original GGH cryptosystem, for more details see [16] . A GGH cryptosystem comprises the following algorithm. Setup: Generate a "good basis" R ∈ Z N ×N and compute a "bad basis"
. Provide B as public key and keep R as private basis. Encryption: To encrypt a message vector m ∈ Z N , use the bad basis to compute
where r is an error vector uniformly chosen from {−σ, σ} N . Decryption: Use the good basis to compute
and r = c − Bm.
Notice that the original GGH cryptosystem is semantically insecure, because one can check if a ciphertext c corresponds to a plaintext m by computing c − Bm. Furthermore, it's obvious that r 2 i = σ 2 for i = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1 and r T r = N σ 2 . This fact can be used to discuss the broadcast attack against the original GGH cryptosystem, which differs from the general method in [10] . The original GGH cryptosystem was attacked and broken severely by Nguyen in 1999 [17] , and Nguyen pointed out that for safety, one can choose the entries of the error vector r at random in [−σ, · · · , σ] instead of {±σ}. Afterwards the other propositions were made using the same principle [18, 19, 20] .
In addition, Pan et al in [15] presented a new latticebased public-key cryptosystem mixed with a knapsack and used the module strategy, which is also a GGH-type cryptosystem, denoted by GGH-2009. It has reasonable key size and quick encryption and decryption. Its encryption algorithm is: for any message m ∈ {0, 1} N , first we uniformly choose a vector r from {0, 1} N , then compute the ciphertext: c = Bm+r mod p, where p is a prime satisfying certain conditions. For more details see [15] . We find that the modified error vector in GGH-2009 has the same special structure as that in the original GGH cryptosystem.
NTRU
We give a simple description of the NTRU-1998 cryptosystem, for more details see [1] .
The NTRU cryptosystem depends on three integer parameters (N, p, q) and four sets L f , Lg, Lr, Lm of polynomials of degree N − 1 with small integer coefficients, where L f , Lg are called Private Key spaces, Lm is called Plaintext space, Lr is called Blinding Value space. In addition, N must be an odd prime, otherwise the lattice attacks can be improved due to non-trivial factors of X N − 1 (see [21] ). We choose p, q such that gcd(p, q) = 1 and p is much smaller than q. Denote the ring Z[x]/(x N − 1) by R and the multiplication in R by * in this paper. We work over the ring R. Key Generation: Step1. Choose f ∈ L f , g ∈ Lg such that there exists Fq, Fp ∈ R satisfying f * Fq = 1 mod q and f * Fp = 1 mod p.
Step2. Let h = p * Fq * g mod q.
Public Key: h, p, q. Private Key: f, Fp. Encryption: To encrypt m ∈ Lm, we first choose an r ∈ Lr randomly, then compute the ciphertext:
Decryption: First we compute a = f * c mod q = pg * r + f * m mod q then we choose the coefficients of a in the interval from − . By the fact that all the coefficients of pg * r + f * m may be in the interval from − , we almost get
Then we recover the message m by computing m = Fp * a mod p.
Since there exist several variants of NTRU, this has made the analysis of NTRU a tricky task, as in [22] . However, in this paper, we give a uniform broadcast attack against NTRU. Mol and Yung in [22] summarized the main instantiations of NTRU in the table below:
where • Lm = {m ∈ R: m has coefficients lying between − 1 2 (p − 1) and
F has d1 coefficients equal 1, d2 coefficients equal −1, the rest 0}, • B denotes the set of all polynomials with binary coefficients, • B(d) = {F ∈ R : F has d coefficients equal 1, the rest 0}.
Remark 1: Let us focus attention on the blinding value space Lr. We find that the inner product r T r = r is a constant, where r = (r0, r1, · · · , rN−1) T is a vector corresponding to r(x) ∈ Lr. Note that increasing the number of recipient's ciphertext can't change plaintext vector m, but increases the number of blinding value vector r respectively. It's is a heavy curse of recovering the plaintext vector m. Hence, we should eliminate the blinding value vector or error vector r.
The Linear Form of NTRU and Circular Matrix
In NTRU, for a polynomial f ∈ R, we can represent f as
It is equivalent to
It's easy to verify the corresponding vector of f * g in R is
In particular, even if fi or gj are functions about x, the formula above also holds. Thus, we have the equivalent linear form of the formula (2.2)
where
As needed, we only consider the circular matrix over Z N ×N q . For simplicity, we give the following convention: hN+i = hi, HN+i,N+j = Hi,j. Clearly, H ∈ Z N ×N q is a circular matrix if and only if Hi,j = HN−j+i+1,1, for i, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N }. We list the fundamental lammas (see [23] ).
are circular matrices, then GH is also a circular matrix. In particular, H T H is a symmetric circular matrix.
We show how to get H −1 and H T H in O(N 2 ) arithmetic operations respectively in Appendix A. Of course, if N is taken to be large, then it might be faster to use Fast Fourier Transforms to compute products H T H in O(N log N ) operations. However, it doesn't impact the final complexity. What's more, it's easy to prove the following theorem.
are circular matrices, which are corresponding to g = P N −1 i=0 gix i and h = P N −1 i=0 hix i respectively, then GH = I mod q if and only if g * h = 1 over
, where I is an identity matrix of order N .
The Proportion of the Matrices of Rank
Here, we discuss a general problem: how big is l, then the linear system L × Y = S mod q only has a single solution with very high probability? Of course, the vector S ∈ Z n+l q , the (random) matrix L ∈ Z (n+l)×n q and the modulus q are known and we know that there is at least one solution. Clearly, that there is a single solution is equivalent to that the rank of L equals to n. Now, we distinguish two cases:
• For the case l = 0, if the matrix L is invertible modulo q, then there is only one solution.
Nguyen [17] gave the following result estimating the proportion of invertible matrices modulo q among all matrices: Theorem 2.4. Let q be a power of prime p. Consider the ring of n × n matrices with entries in Zq. Then the proportion of invertible matrices (i.e., with determinant coprime to q) is equal to:
• For the case l = 1 or 2, it's easy to obtain the following generalization of Theorem 3 in [17] :
Theorem 2.5. Let Fq be the finite field with q elements, where q is a prime power. The proportion of matrices of rank n in the set of (n + l) × n matrices with entries in Fq is equal to:
For the sake of completeness, detailed proof is provided in Appendix B. Note that the proportions above converge quickly to their limit. The numerical experiment shows that the proportion can be considered as a constant for high dimensions (higher than 50). Table 1 gives numerical results for the case l = 0, 1, and 2. It shows that if l = 0, the random matrix L is invertible mod q with non-negligible probability, and with very high probability for p > 59. And we see that for the case l = 1, there is a single solution with very high probability.
THE BROADCAST ATTACKS AGAINST NTRU

Analyse the ergodic-linearization algorithm against GGH
We first analyse the ergodic-linearization algorithm [12, 13, 14] against the original GGH, which naturally deduces the broadcast attacks against NTRU.
For the formula (2.1), we do the ergodic on the error set to get
. This linearization will produce N linear equations from every recipient's ciphertext in the form of
a N−1 are linearly independent, unless there exists ci = 0 to make them linearly dependent possibly. Hence, we need at least
recipients' ciphertexts and the corresponding public keys to obtain a system of linear congruence equations
matrix, and S is a constant vector. And we can find m by solving the above set of linear equations over Z.
Another way is to take the sum of the equation (3.1) for i = 0, 1, · · · , N − 1, which is equivalent to do the inner product
Note that r T r = N σ 2 , we get
Then we treat (3.2) in the same way as above. This linearization will produce one linear equation from every recipient's ciphertext in the form of a T Y = N σ 2 −c T c. Hence, we need at least
recipients' ciphertexts/public-keys pairs to obtain a system of linear congruence equations L × Y = S.
Obviously, for another encoding method Br + m = c, first we get wherer ∈ {−1, 1} N . Then we can treat (3.3) in the same way as that for the original GGH.
Remark 2: Obviously, doing the inner product is worse than doing square, because the public key B has no good global property as the matrixĤ in NTRU, which is an invertible circular matrix. Nonetheless, this method naturally deduces the broadcast attack against NTRU.
How to do the Broadcast Attacks against NTRU
with high probability in NTRU-2001 with an odd dg and NTRU-2005 with gcd(q, dg) = 1 (the proportion of invertible elements is close to 1, which can be computed as in [24] ). Hence, we can easily choose H which is invertible, then get an invertible circular matrixĤ and it requires O(N 2 ) arithmetic operations by Lemma 2.1. Another way to estimate whether H is invertible in Z N ×N q or not is to observe whether gcd(det(L), q) = 1 or not.
However, for NTRU-2001 with an even dg and NTRU-2005 with q | dg, H is not invertible. We need some extra restriction: q | dr, to get an invertible H. In addition, H is not invertible in NTRU-1998. Luckily, the public key h is "pseudo-invertible" mod q with overwhelming probability. More precisely, there is the following result [25] .
Lemma 3.1. For any public key h in NTRU-1998, there exists a polynomial h ∈ R with overwhelming probability such that for any r ∈ Lr h * h * r = r mod q. with high probability, as mentioned in [24] . Hence, we can assume that q | dg.
Since h(1) = 0 mod q, we have φ(h) = (0,h) (therefore h is not invertible in Rq), whereh denotes the reduction of h modulo x N −1 + x N −2 + · · · + 1. Note that x N −1 + x N −2 + · · · + 1 is an irreducible polynomial, the proportion that the (random)h is invertible in P2 is very high probability (it's equal to 1 − q 1−N ). We denote its inverse in P2 byh, then h * h = 1 over P2. Using Extended Euclidean Algorithm for
, we can geth with O(N 2 ) arithmetic operations (see [26] , pp.71-72, Corollary 4.6). Meanwhile, using the above algorithm, we compute polynomials u and v satisfying (x N −1 + x N −2 + · · · + 1)u + (x − 1)v = 1. Then the Chinese Remainder Theorem tells us that
in Rq and it uses O(N 2 ) arithmetic operations. Since φ(h * h) = (1,h)(0,h) = (0, 1), we can set
where ω(x) satisfies N ω(1) + 1 = 0 mod q. Hence, together with q | dr, for r ∈ B(dr) we have h) ) is the invertible element of h , then H is an invertible circular matrix by Theorem 2.3. Similarly, letĤ = H , b = H c mod q, then we also get the formula (3.4).
With the analysis above, it's natural to get the following theorem. Based on Theorem 3.2, we can obtain the following main theorem. )) independent recipients' ciphertexts and corresponding public keys known, there exists a polynomial time algorithm to recover the plaintext successfully. P roof . Algorithm consists of three steps.
Step 1. Separating r from Hr and Derandomization By Theorem 3.2, we can get
Then, we do the inner product
Note that r T r = d is a constant, we get 
Of course, even if N is even, we can easily obtain the same result. The formula above is equivalent to
Combining the formulae (3.7) and (3.9), we can get
What's more, there is a positive integer u ≥ 1 such that 2 u divides the greatest common divisor of all the coefficients but 2 u+1 can not. If u ≥ k, then the equation (3.10) is noneffective. In fact u = 1 holds for very high probability. We just use those samples in which u = 1, so we have
Notice that the formula (3.8) can be obtained from any other recipient's ciphertext. Hence we need at least N + [
] − 1 recipients' ciphertexts and the corresponding public keys to obtain a system of linear congruence equations
where L is a (N +[
T and S is a constant vector. However, in the practical experiments, we take L ∈ Z
to guarantee that the rank of L equals to N + [
], where
] + l, l ∈ N. Fortunately, in practice scheme q = 128, 256 or other larger number of the form 2 k , Table 1 in Section 2.4 indicates that even if we take l = 1, the rank of the random matrix L equals to N + [
] with very high probability (close to 1).
• For NTRU-2001 with an odd dg and NTRU-2001 with q = dr, since m 2 i = mi holds for mi ∈ {0, 1}, we have
Similar to NTRU-1998, we can easily get
The formula above is equivalent to
By combining the formulae (3.11) and (3.12), we can get
There is a positive integer u ≥ 1 such that 2 u divides the greatest common divisor of all the coefficients but 2 u+1 can not. Similar to NTRU-1998, u = 1 holds for very high probability. We just use those samples in which u = 1, so we have
(3.13) Notice that the two formulae (3.12) and (3.13) can be obtained from any other recipient's ciphertext. Hence, we need at least N + [
] − 2 recipients' ciphertexts/public-keys to obtain a system of linear congruence equations
T and S is a constant vector. However, in the practical experiments, we take
], where Q = N + [
] + l, l ∈ N. Table 1 in Section 2.4 indicates that even if we take l = 1, the rank of L equals to N + [
•
Since q is a odd prime, there exists the inverse of 2 mod q. Thus, the formulae (3.15) and (3.16) are equivalent to
Notice that the two formulae (3.14) and (3.17) can be obtained from any other recipient's ciphertext. Hence, we need at least N + [
] − 2 recipients' ciphertexts/publickeys to obtain a system of linear congruence equations L × Y = S mod q, where L is a (N + [
to guarantee that the rank of L equals to N + [ ] + l, l ∈ N. NTRU-2005 in [3] takes q = 197, 251, 367 or larger primes in practice scheme, Table 1 indicates that even if we take l = 0, the rank of L equals to N + [
Step 3. Solving the system of linear congruence equations We use Gaussian Elimination to solve where n = N +[
] and uii = 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , n. Thus, we use back substitution method to solve mN−1, mN−2, · · · , m1, not the whole Y.
Another way is to use the Hermite Normal Form.
T .
We compute the Hermite Normal Form B of
is a unimodular matrix (see [27] , pp.69, Algorithm 2.4.6), then get B T Y = U T S mod q by multiplying U T , finally by iteration solve m0, m1, · · · , mN−1 in turn, not the whole Y.
2 Specifically, we have the following result (l ∈ N, T = the number of variables):
Pan and Deng in [11] gave the following result:
Remark 3: Comparing the two tables above, our method is very efficient in the number of variables and time complexity. In particular, for NTRU-1998 our method is very nice and better than that in [11] . We eliminate the blinding value vector r directly and entirety by doing the inner product from every recipient's ciphertext, differing from eliminating r by using ergodic in [11] . However, our method doesn't work against NTRU with encryption padding.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
All experiments were performed on a Windows XP system with a 2.93 GHz Pentium 4 processor and 4 GByte RAM using Shoup's NTL library version 5.4.1 [28] .
We implemented the broadcast attacks against three variants of NTRU. For NTRU-1998 and NTRU-2001, we adopted the algorithms for u = 1. In our experiments, we always obtained an matrix L, whose the rank equals to N + [ N 2 ]. The number of recipients is just a little more than the number of variables (denoted by T). Since the number of variables is small, the experiment evidence indicates that our algorithm can efficiently broadcast attack against NTRU with very large parameters. Some results against NTRU with the highest security parameters are listed below: 
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we first discuss the ergodic-linearization algorithm against GGH, then naturally deduce new and uniform broadcast attacks against several variants of NTRU, which is based on the special structure of blinding value space Lr. From which we can see two main lines to study the algebraic broadcast attacks: one is decreasing the number of variables; the other is increasing the number of equations. Now, the main question is that how to do the broadcast attacks against NTRU, GGH and other cryptosystems more efficiently if the error vectors lack of the special structure.
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B. PROOF OF THEOREM 2.5
Theorem 2.5 is equivalent to consider the set of n × (n + l) matrices with entries in Fq. We count the number of matrices of the form (b1, b2, · · · , bn+1) of rank n, where bi ∈ Z n q . Denote by B k the subspace spanned by b1, b2, · · · , b k , with the convention B0 being the nullspace. Recall that a kdimensional subspace has cardinality q k . For each family (b1, b2, · · · , bn+1) of rank n, there exists a unique i such that b1, b2, · · · , bi−1 are linearly independent, bi ∈ Bi−1, and for all j > i, bj ∈ Bj−1. There are Q i−2 k=0 (q n − q k ) possibilities for b1, b2, · · · , bi−1. There are q i−1 choices for bi. And there are Q n−1 k=i−1 (q n − q k ) possibilities for bi+1, bi+2, · · · , bn+1. It follows that the total number of families is:
(1 − q −k ). Now, consider a family (b1, b2, · · · , bn+2) of rank n. There exists a unique (i, j) with i < j such that b1, b2, · · · , bi−1 are linearly independent, bi ∈ Bi−1, for all i < t < j, bt ∈ Bt−1, bj ∈ Bj−1 and for all t > j, bt ∈ Bt−1. That way, we know the dimension of Bt for all t, and therefore, the number of (b1, b2, · · · , bn+2) corresponding to a given (i, j) is:
It follows that the total number of families of rank n is:
Then compute the double sum:
q − 1 = (q n+2 − 1)(q n+1 − 1) (q − 1)(q 2 − 1) .
Therefore, the number of families is:
(1 − q −k ).
Note: The proof above is modelled on the proof of Theorem 3 in [17] .
